Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

In the matter of the estate of Lyman W. Hemmert
aka L. W. Hemmert, deceased, Rose Nagy
Hemmert : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian R. Florence; Florence & Hutchison; attorney for personal representative.
Ben H. Hadfield; Mann, Hadfield & Thorne; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hemmert v. Hemmert, No. 900482.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3239

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

yiAM
DOCUMENT
KFU

45.9
tS9
DOCKET HO:

BRIEF.

. 9aWo2-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
LYMAN W. HEMMERT aka L. W.
HEMMERT, Deceased,
ROSE NAGY HEMMERT,

Supmeme Court No. 900482

Appellant,

Priority (16)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE F. L. GUNNELL. JUDGE
BEN H. HADFIELD
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
98 North Main - Zions Bank Building
P. 0. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906
Attorneys for Appellant
BRIAN R. FLORENCE
FLORENCE & HUTCHISON
818 - 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Personal
Representative

FILE
APR 1 9 1991

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
LYMAN W. HEMMERT aka L. W.
HEMMERT, Deceased,
ROSE NAGY HEMMERT,

Supreme Court No. 900482

Appellant,

Priority (16)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE F. L. GUNNELL. JUDGE
BEN H. HADFIELD
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
98 North Main - Zions Bank Building
P. O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906
Attorneys for Appellant
BRIAN R. FLORENCE
FLORENCE & HUTCHISON
818 - 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 844 01
Attorneys for Personal
Representative

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities

ii

Jurisdiction of Appellate Court

1

Statement of Issues Presented for Review

1

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved

1

Statement of the Case

2

Statement of Facts

3

Summary of Arguments

5

Argument
I.

II.
III.

IV.

The Validity of the Prenuptial Agreement
Should be Determined by the Law of the
State Where the Contract Was Made.

6

Utah has the Most Significant Contacts
with the Prenuptial Agreement.

8

If Florida Law is Applied, a "Meeting of
12
the Minds" is a Prerequisite to the
Creation of a Valid Agreement. The District
Court Erred in Refusing Appellant's Jury
Instruction on This Issue and Directing
Judgment for the Estate.
If Florida Law is Applied, Fraud May Void
the Prenuptial Agreement. The District
Court Erred in Refusing Appellant's Jury
Instructions on the Issue of Fraud and
Directing Judgment for the Estate.

Conclusion
Appendix

16

17
Jury Verdict July 13, 1990
Memorandum Decision August 10, 1990

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE

PAGE(S)

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullam. 349 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1973)

9

Ashland Oil, Inc. v. TuckerF 768 S.W.2d 595 Mo.
Ct. App. (1989)

9

Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271 (Utah App. 1988)

9

Boggs v. Anderson. 381 P.2d 419, 72 N.M.136 (1963)

6

Boise Cascade v. Utilities Inc.. 468 N.E.2d 442 127
111. App.3d 4 (1984)

9

Carlson v. Boryla. 490 P.2d 700 (Colo. App. 1971)

6

Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Radio Foods Corp.. 240
A.2d 47, 108 N.H. 494 (1968)

9

Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm. 701 P.2d 806,
41 Wash. App. 26 (1985)

9

D'Aston V. D'Aston. 794 P.2d 500 (Utah App. 1990)

9

Dick V. Dick. 355 A.2d 110, 167 Conn. 210 (1974)

6

Dohm & Nelke v. Wilson Foods. 531 N.E.2d 512
Ind. Ct. App. (1988)

9

Estate of Roberts. 388 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1980)

13

Fowler v. A & A Co.. 262 A.2d 344 (D.C. App. 1970)
Goff v. Indian Lake Estates. 178 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1965)

6
13

Goodman v. Olsen. 305 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1974)

7

In re Danz' Estate. 283 A.2d 282, 444 Pa. 411 (1971)

6

Joiner v. McCullers. 28 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1947)
Kramer v. Bally's Park Place. Inc.. 535 A.2d 466,
311 Md. 387 (1988)

ii

17
6

Norse Petroleum A/S v. LVO Intern. Inc., 389 A.2d
771 (Del, Sup, 1978)
Osborn v. Osborn, 226 N.E.2d 814, 10 Ohio Misc.
171 (1966)
Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace, 192 A.158, 58 R.I.
162 (1937)
Padova v. Padova, 183 A.2d 227, 123 Vt. 125 (1962)
Reynolds v. Continental Mortg. Co., 377 P.2d 134,
85 Idaho 172 (1962)
Ross v. Ross, 393 P.2d 933, 96 Ariz. 249 (1964)
Simms v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 685 P.2d 321
(Kan. App. 1984)
Telex Corp. v. Hamilton, 576 P.2d 767 (Okla. 1978)

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated 75-2-201
Utah Code Annotated 75-2-204
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2
Florida Statutes Annotated §732-702(2)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1969)
American Law Institute

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
LYMAN W. HEMMERT aka L. W.
HEMMERT, Deceased,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ROSE NAGY HEMMERT,

Supreme Court No. 900482

Appellant,

Priority (16)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellate review of the District Court Judgment involves two
questions of law to be reviewed for correctness.

In both

instances the standard of review involves a determination as to
whether the District Court correctly applied the law in
overturning the jury verdict and entering judgment for the
estate.

In reviewing questions of law, no deference is given to

the trial court's position.

Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782

P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989)

(Insert)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
LYMAN W. HEMMERT aka L. W.
HEMMERT, Deceased,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ROSE NAGY HEMMERT,

Supreme Court No, 900482

Appellant,
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction over
this matter as an appeal from a final Order of the District Court
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-2-2 (as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellate Review of the District Court judgment involves the
following questions of law to be reviewed for correctness.
1.

Was the District Court correct in applying Florida law

to determine the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement executed in
Utah by the parties on September 10, 1976?
2.

If Florida law is applied in determining the validity of

the Prenuptial Agreement, did the District Court err in entering
judgment for the estate?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES HERE INVOLVED
UCA §75-2-204. Waiver of right to elect and of
other rights. The right of election of a surviving
spouse and the rights of the surviving spouse to
homestead allowance, exempt property and family
allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or
partially, before or after marriage, by a written

contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the party
waiving after fair disclosure. Unless it provides to
the contrary, a waiver of "all rights" (or equivalent
language) in the property or estate of a present or
prospective spouse or a complete property settlement
entered into after or in anticipation of separation or
divorce is a waiver of all rights to elective share,
homestead allowance, exempt property, and family
allowance by each spouse in the property of the other
and a renunciation by each of all benefits which would
otherwise pass to him from the other by intestate
succession or by virtue of the provisions of any will
execut€id before the waiver or property settlement,
(emphasis added)
F.S.A. §732-702(2). No disclosure shall be
required for an agreement, contract or waiver executed
before marriage.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was filed pursuant to U.C.A. 75-2-201 whereby
Appellant, Rose Nagy Hemmert, as the surviving widow of the
deceased, Lyman Hemmert, exercised her right to an "elective
share" of the deceased's estate.

The personal representative of

the estate raised a Prenuptial Agreement dated September 10, 1976
as a defense to the claim for elective share.

This case was

tried to a jury in the First District Court in Brigham City on
July 12 and 13, 1990 and the jury returned a verdict finding
there was not fair disclosure in the preparation and execution of
the Prenuptial Agreement and it was, therefore, invalid.

On

August 10, 1990 the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision
reversing its own jury instructions, ruling that Florida law
should have been applied, and determining that since under
Florida law no disclosure is required in the execution of a
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Prenuptial Agreement, judgment should be entered for the estate
and Appellant's claim for elective share denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rose Hemmert is an immigrant from Hungary, having come to
the United States in the early 1970s.
formal training in English.
Miami, Florida.

She has never had any

In 1975 she met Lyman Hemmert in

During the following year the parties courted

each other, both in Florida and in Utah.

Rose resided in Logan,

Utah during the summer of 1976. At that time and for many years
preceding, Lyman resided in Brigham City, Utah.

Lyman's

attorney, Dale M. Dorius, practicing in Brigham City, prepared a
Prenuptial Agreement in behalf of Lyman.

This agreement was

executed by the parties on September 10, 1976 in Utah.

The

parties were married in Utah on September 16, 1976.
Rose testified that at the time the Prenuptial Agreement was
signed, she had no comprehension as to the meaning or purpose of
the agreement, but signed it because her prospective husband
assured her that he would "take care of her."

She further

testified that at the time the Prenuptial Agreement was signed,
she had not conferred with any legal counsel representing
herself, nor had anyone who spoke Hungarian attempted to explain
the meaning or content of the agreement to her.

Attorney Dale M.

Dorius testified that in preparing the Prenuptial Agreement he
had negotiated with a Hungarian speaking attorney in Florida who
represented Rose.

The telephone records of Mr. Dorius for that

time period did not document any telephone calls from his office
3

to such an attorney, nor could Mr. Dorius produce any
correspondence either to or from such an individual.
Immediately after the marriage the parties traveled from
Utah to Miami, Florida.

During the entire ten and one-half year

duration of the marriage the parties split their time between
their condominium in Miami, Florida and an apartment which they
always maintained in Brigham City, Utah.

Lyman returned to

Brigham City at least five or six times every year.
At the time of execution of the Prenuptial Agreement and
throughout the entire term of the marriage the vast majority of
Lyman's assets were located in Utah.
1987.

Lyman died on February 9,

On February 29, 1987 a Petition for Formal Probate of Will

and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative was filed by
Lymanfs daughter, Alonna Cook, in the First District Court, Box
Elder County, Utah.

The Petition alleged:

"At the time of death

the decedent was domiciled in this county."
At trial Dr. Robert W. Belka, Chairman of the Foreign
Language Department at Weber State College testified as an expert
witness for the Appellant.

He testified about an evaluation

system used by the United States State Department in evaluating
foreign language skills.

Based upon his review of a 49 page

deposition given by Rose Hemmert in December, 1989, he testified
that Rose Hemmertfs English language skills were insufficient for
her to comprehend the meaning of the Prenuptial Agreement.
A letter dated March 9, 1981 in Lyman's handwriting
addressed to an automobile insurance company was introduced into
4

evidence, wherein Lyman advised the insurance company that Rose
was not fluent in the English language and probably did not
understand the correspondence which it had sent to her.

He

requested that all future correspondence be directed to him, and
provided only a Utah address.
The personal representative of the estate testified that in
1976 Rose "had a difficult time with the English language."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The traditional and apparently majority rule in the United
States is that the validity of an agreement is determined by the
law of the place where the agreement was made.

An emerging trend

advanced by the American Law Institute suggests that the validity
and interpretation of a contract should be governed by the
jurisdiction having the most significant contacts with the
agreement and the parties.

The facts in this case dictate that

under either of the foregoing theories, Utah law must be applied
in determining the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement.
In the alternative, if Utah law is not applied to determine
the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement, this matter should be
returned to the District Court with directions to conduct a new
trial.

Under existing Florida law, a meeting of the minds is

necessary to the creation of a valid agreement.

Also, under

Florida law, fraud or misrepresentation may void an otherwise
valid agreement.

The District Court refused Appellant's

requested instructions on both of these issues.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE VALIDITY OP THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE
DETERMINED BY THE LAW OP THE STATE WHERE THE CONTRACT
WAS MADE.

Counsel has not discovered any Utah Appellate Court Opinions
concerning the "choice of laws" question presented by this case.
A review of the case law from other jurisdictions indicates that
the majority or traditional rule is lex loci contractus.

This

means that the contract is governed by the law of the location
where the contract was made.

The courts seem to particularly

adopt this atpproach when addressing questions as to the validity
of a contract.

The following citations provide a representative

sample of this approach:
Ross v. Ross. 393 P.2d 933, 96 Ariz. 249 (1964), Carlson v.
Boryla, 490 P.2d 700 (Colo. App. 1971), Dick v. Dick, 355 A.2d
110, 167 Conn. 210 (1974), Norse Petroleum A/S v. LVO Intern.,
Inc., 389 A.2d 771 (Del. Superior 1978), Fowler v. A & A Co., 262
A.2d 344 (D.C. App. 1970), Reynolds v. Continental Mortcr. Co. ,
311 P.2d 134, 85 Idaho 172 (1962), Simms v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 685 P.2d 321 (Kan. App. 1984), Kramer v. Bally f s Park
Place, Inc., 535 A.2d 466, 311 Md. 387 (1988), Boggs v. Anderson,
381 P.2d 419, 72 N.M. 136 (1963), Telex Corp. v. Hamilton, 576
P.2d 767 (Okla. 1978), In re Danzf Estate, 283 A.2d 282, 444 Pa.
411 (1971), Owens v. Haaenbeck-Wallace, 192 A. 158, 58 R.I. 162
(1937), Padova v. Padova, 183 A.2d 227, 123 Vt. 125 (1962).
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It is undisputed that the contract involved in this appeal
was made and executed in the State of Utah.

If the parties

expected the contract to be governed by Florida law, logic
dictates that a Florida attorney would have been retained to
draft the agreement.

The evidence shows that a Utah attorney

prepared the agreement.
The trial court erred in its interpretation and application
of Florida law.

The court ruled that since by statute Florida

does not require any type of disclosure in the creation of a
prenuptial agreement, the jury instruction requiring fair
disclosure as mandated by Utah statute, was improper.

However,

as noted, the Prenuptial Agreement was made and executed in Utah.
Florida law states that the nature, validity, and interpretation
of contracts, are to be governed by the lex loci of the country
or state where the contracts are made or are to be performed; but
the remedies are to be governed by the lex fori.
Olsen, 305 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1974).

Goodman v.

If the trial court is

consistent in its determination that Florida law governs in this
case, then the Goodman case mandates that the trial court apply
Utah law and, therefore, the "fair disclosure11 test, in
determining the validity of this contract.

This means that the

jury was properly instructed and has rendered a legitimate
verdict determining the prenuptial agreement invalid.
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II.

UTAH HAS THE "MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS" WITH THIS
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT.

As an alternative to the traditional lex loci rule, a modern
trend has emerged which adopts the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws approach.

Section 188 of the Restatement

(Second) provides:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect
to an issue in contract are determined by the local law
of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and
the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties, (citation omitted) the contacts to be
taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a)

the place of contracting,

(b)

the place of negotiation of the contract,

(c)

the place of performance,

(d)

the location of the subject matter of the
contract, and

(e)

the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business
of the parties.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular
issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the
place of performance are in the same state the local
law of this state will usually be applied . . .
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188, p. 575 (1969)
(emphasis added).
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If the most significant contact test is the law in Utah,
then the foregoing principles apply to a Prenuptial Agreement in
the same respect they apply to any other contract.
Utah Courts have applied general contract
principles when interpreting prenuptial agreements.
See DfAston v. DfAston. 794 P.2d 500 (Utah App. 1990),
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah App. 1988).
(A prenuptial agreement should be treated like any
other contract).
A number of states have adopted the most significant
contacts test, as articulated in the following opinions:

Boise

Cascade v. Utilities Inc., 468 N.E.2d 442, 127 111. App.3d 4
(1984), Dohm & Nelke v. Wilson Foods. 531 N.E.2d 512 Ind. Ct.
App. (1988), Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Tucker, 768 S.W.2d 595 Mo. Ct.
App. (1989), Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Radio Foods Corp., 240
A.2d 47, 108 N.H. 494 (1968), Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullam, 349
N.Y.S.2d 550 (1973) and Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm, 701
P.2d 806, 41 Wash. App. 26 (1985).
In its Memorandum Decision of August 10, 1990 reversing the
jury verdict and directing judgment for the estate the District
Court placed significant emphasis on the case of Osborn v.
Osborn, 226 N.E.2d 814 (1966) 10 Ohio Misc. 171. Appellant has
no quarrel with the Osborn opinion.

In applying Osborn. the

District Court failed to note distinguishing facts and
misinterpreted the legal theory of the opinion.

In Osborn the

husband and wife executed a prenuptial agreement in
Massachusetts, were married in Massachusetts, and thereafter
returned to the husbandfs home in Ohio.
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In contrast to the

present case, however, the deceased had been a lifelong resident
of the State of Ohio.

The prenuptial agreement had been prepared

by the deceased's Ohio attorney in the State of Ohio and then
mailed to Massachusetts.

Further, the majority of the deceased's

property was located in the State of Ohio at the time of his
death.

Finally, Mr. Osborn's estate was being probated in the

State of Ohio.
The District Court seems to believe that Osborn stands for
the principal that the law of the "marital domicile" should
govern in the validity and interpretation of prenuptial
agreements.

The Osborn opinion makes no such assertion but

rather bases its decision upon the "most significant contacts"
test.

Osborn states:
It would appear that Ohio follows a developing
conflict of laws principle being advanced by the
American Law Institute which advocates putting more
emphasis upon the intention of the parties and other
additional factors designed to apply the law that has
the most substantial contacts with the agreement in
question.
. . . There can be little question that Ohio has
the most significant contacts with and paramount
interest in the parties, in the agreement, and in
questions concerning its validity. Osborn, 10 Ohio
Misc. 171, 226 N.E.2d at 818. (emphasis added)
A review of the facts in Osborn demonstrates that Ohio had

the most significant contacts.

That is the standard established

by Osborn.
The following facts are dispositive in determining which
jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with the Hemmert
Prenuptial Agreement:
10

1.

The Prenuptial Agreement was prepared in Utah by a Utah

lawyer.

T. 166 L. 22-25, T. 167 L. 1-3, T. 168 L. 17-18, PI. Ex.

#2.
2.

The Prenuptial Agreement was executed in Utah.

T. 84

L. 12-23, PI. Ex. #2.
3.

Lyman Hemmert resided in Utah for many years prior to

his marriage to Rose Hemmert.

T. 231 L. 6-20, Def. Ex. #4 and

#10, Dorius Dep. P. 2 L. 18-23.
4.

Rose Hemmert resided in Utah for approximately two

months prior to signing the Prenuptial Agreement.

T. 53 L. 5-15,

T. 232 L. 8-18, Def. Ex. #4.
5.

Lyman and Rose Hemmert were married in the State of

Utah September 16, 1976.
6.

T. 59 L. 8-12, Def. Ex. #4.

At the time of execution of the Prenuptial Agreement,

most of Lyman Hemmert^ assets were located in Utah.

T. 172 L.

14-25.
7.

At the time of his death, most of Lyman Hemmert^

assets were located in Utah.
8.

(Inventory, Document #21)

Lyman and Rose Hemmert maintained an apartment in

Brigham City, Utah, throughout the ten and one half years of
marriage.
9.

T. 152 L. 12-15.
During the marriage Lyman Hemmert returned to Brigham

City, Utah, at least five or six times every year.
returned to Brigham City at least every summer.
T. 153 L. 3-5.
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Rose Hemmert

T. 66 L. 16-24,

10.

Correspondence issued by Lyman Hemmert in 1981 showed a

Brigham City, Utah, return address.
11.

PI. Ex. #1.

The Probate of Lyman Hemmertvs Estate was commenced in

Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah, on February 19, 1987.
(Petition, Document #3)
12.

In her Verified Petition for Formal Appointment of

Personal Representative, Alonna Cook stated under oath that Lyman
W. Hemmert was domiciled in Box Elder County, Utah at the time of
his death on February 9, 1987.

(Petition, Document #3)

Appellant challenges the estate to compile a listing of the
facts in this case which indicate the State of Florida has the
most significant contacts with this Prenuptial Agreement.

The

list will be both short and anemic.
The District Court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict
should be reversed.

Inasmuch as the jury was instructed

according to Utah law, the jury's verdict should be reinstated.
III. EVEN UNDER FLORIDA LAW A "MEETING OF THE MINDS" IS A
PREREQUISITE TO THE CREATION OF A VALID
CONTRACT. THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING
JUDGMENT FOR THE ESTATE.
Appellant's requested Jury Instruction No. 6 reads:
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there must be a meeting of the minds
of the parties. That is, an agreement as to what
constitute the terms or provisions of the contract.
This mutual assent of both parties is essential to
create a valid contract. The party who claims there is
a contract, in this case the estate of Lyman W.
Hemmert, has the burden of proving that there was a
meeting of the minds and a mutual assent at the time
the prenuptial agreement was signed.
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The trial court refused to include this instruction in its
charge to the jury and it was, therefore, unaware of any such
legal requirement.

Even if this court determines that Florida

law should apply in determining the validity of the Prenuptial
Agreement, Florida law dictates that Appellant's requested
Instruction No. 6 should have been given to the jury.
Opposing counsel and the lower court seem to have placed an
unwarranted amount of emphasis on Florida Statute §732.702(2)
which states that no disclosure shall be required for a
prenuptial agreement.

In interpreting this statute the Florida

High Court has stated that the statute does not abolish the
wife's right to sue to have a prenuptial agreement set aside, but
only alters one of the elements that the court may consider in
determining the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement.

Estate of

Roberts, 388 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1980).
In Florida an essential component to creation of a valid
agreement is a "meeting of the minds."
It is essential to the creation of a contract that
there be a mutual or reciprocal assent to a certain and
definite proposition. Until the terms of an agreement
have received the assent of both parties the
negotiation is open and imposes no obligation upon
either. Without a meeting of the minds of the parties
on an essential element there can be no enforceable
contract. Goff v. Indian Lake Estates, 178 So.2d 910
(Fla. 1965). (emphasis added)
The following transcript excerpts demonstrate that there was
no meeting of the minds because Rose Hemmert had no idea what the
Prenuptial Agreement said or did.
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Q.

Let's back up for a minute, the papers that Mr. Dorius
prepared, did Lyman tell you what those
papers were?

A,

I didn't know who Dorius was. Lyman said we sign
papers and we go to the meeting. I figure I
just sign it.

Q.

Did he tell you why you were signing the papers?

A.

No.

Q.

Did he tell you what the papers were?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you know what they were?

A.

I told him, what is this? He said don't worry I take
catre of you. We signed and later got
married."
(T. 55 L. 6-20.)

Q.

Did Mr. Dorius tell you anything about the papers?

A.

No.

Q.

Did Mr. Dorius ask you if you spoke and understood
English?

A.

No.

Q.

Did anyone translate the papers or help you by speaking
Hungarian to understand the papers?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever talk with your own attorney, an attorney
separate from Mr. Dorius before you signed
the papers?

A.

No*

Q.

When you signed that paper did you know what the paper
meant or what it said?

A.

No.

We did not talk about anything.

I had no attorney.

I had no idea.

I didn't know.

(T. 56 L. 2-14 and 23-25)

After being qualified as a linguistics expert and explaining
a standardized test used by the United States State Department in
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evaluating an individual's skills in a foreign language, Dr.
Robert Belka testified that he had examined a 49 page deposition
transcript from Rose Hemmert and also examined the Prenuptial
Agreement.

Dr. Belka testified that the Prenuptial Agreement was

written at a Level 5 language level, which is the most
sophisticated classification.
Q.

Would a person with Rose Hemmert's 1989 English
language skills be able to read and
understand and comprehend Exhibit 5 which you
have in your possession?

A.

No. As I said, as a general rule you can say
your productive skills are one level lower
than the receptive skills. She's Level 1.
She could read and listen and hear at Level
1, but Level 5 would be beyond her
linguistically." (T. 138 L. 1-9)

The personal representative of the estate, Alonna Cook,
testified:
Q.

Rose Hemmert had a hard time with the English language
when you met her, didn't she?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that would have been back in 76?

A.

Yes.

In the State of Florida an essential component to an
agreement is a meeting of the minds.

Inasmuch as Rose Hemmert

had no idea what she had signed nor what the document
accomplished, there was no meeting of the minds.

The lower

court's directed judgment in favor of the estate must be
reversed.
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IV.

THERE WAS EVIDENCE OP FRAUD WHICH MIGHT VOID THE
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT# EVEN UNDER FLORIDA LAW.
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING JUDGMENT FOR THE
ESTATE•

Appellant's requested Instructions 8 and 9 read as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
Fraudulent misrepresentations as to the legal
effect of an instrument will void it, even if made to
one who has actually read the document, if that
individual is unable to judge the document's true
construction; the fraud must be contemporaneous with
the execution of the instrument and must consist in
obtaining the assent of the party defrauded by inducing
a false impression as to its legal or literal nature
and operation.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
An agreement obtained by misrepresentation, fraud,
or mistake is generally voidable.
The lower court refused to give either of the above
requested instructions.

Apparently the court forgot that the

instructions were vigorously requested.

In its August 10, 1990

Memorandum Decision the lower court wrote:
The court observes that there has been no claim,
nor is there any evidence that there was fraud or
misrepresentation in the initial entering into of the
agreement and the court specifically finds that there
was none. (emphasis added)
Although Appellant did not understand nor comprehend the
Prenuptial Agreement, she was told by the deceased that he "would
take care of her."

She was instructed to sign the papers so that

the deceased and Appellant could hurry to a dinner to meet his
family.
English.

T. 55, L. 6-20.

Appellant had never had any classes in

T. 52, L. 12-15.

There was no translation of the
16

documents, nor Hungarian explanation.

T. 56, L. 2-14 and 23-25.

Appellant could neither read nor comprehend the document.

T.

138, L. 1-9, T. 150, L. 15-19.
Attorney Dorius testified that there had been a full
disclosure of all information and that he had, in fact, conversed
with an attorney who represented Rose and who spoke Hungarian.
Mr. Dorius1 testimony is in stark contrast to Rose Hemmert's.
Obviously the jury believed Rose and did not believe Dorius. The
fraud involved here is representing the document as helpful to
Rose Hemmert when it was clearly detrimental to her.

The Florida

Supreme Court has said:
The rule that fraud cannot be predicated on a
failure to disclose facts where the information is as
accessible to one party as to the other, and the truth
may be ascertained by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, does not justify a resort to active deceit
or fraud, and hence, does not apply where a party in
addition to non-disclosure uses any artifice . . . to
lull him (her) into a false security . . . The
concealment becomes a fraud where it is effected by
misleading and deceptive talk . . . or to a covering up
or disguising of the truth, or to a withdrawal or
distraction of a party's attention from the real facts;
thence the line is overstepped and the concealment
becomes a fraud. Joiner v. McCullers, 28 So.2d 823,
825 (Fla. 1947).
There was significant evidence of fraud in the creation of
this agreement and the inducement of Rose to sign the agreement.
The lower court's judgment directed in favor of the estate should
be reversed as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The traditional rule in determining the validity of a
contract is that the validity of the contract should be
17

determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was
made.

There is an emerging trend indicating that the validity

and interpretation of contracts should be determined according to
the law of the jurisdiction having the "most significant
contacts" with the agreement.

Application of either of these

approaches to the present case mandates that Utah Law should be
applied in determining the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement.
The Memorandum Decision and Judgment of the District Court should
be reversed and this matter remanded to the District Court with
instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict.
In the alternative, in the event the court determines that
no disclosure was required in the creation of the Prenuptial
Agreement, this case should still be remanded to the District
Court for retrial.

The District Court erred in refusing to

instruct the jury concerning the contractual requirement of a
meeting of the minds and the effect of fraud.
DATED this

/7

day of April, 1991.

A/
BEN H. HADFIELD
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of April, 1991, I
mailed four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Brian
R. Florence at Florence & Hutchison, 818 - 26th Street, Ogden,
Utah 84401.

BEN H. HADFIELD
tr/1 -.hemmert.brf
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of
VERDICT
Probate No. 873006067

LYMAN W. HEMMERT, aka;
L.W. HEMMERT,
Deceased.

We the jury in the above-entitled matter find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff did not receive
fair discolsure and the pre-nuptial agreement is therefore invalid,

DATED this

/2#
/o> —

day of July, 1990.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of:
LYMAN W. HEMMERT, aka,
L.W. HEMMERT,
Deceased

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Probate No. 873006067

This matter came before the Court on the Estates' Motion
immediately prior to Trial for a directed verdict and/or Motion in
Limine with the issue being the relevant law governing the
determination of the validity of the pre-nuptial agreement.
The court at that time, denied the Motion because there was
insufficient time to address the issue appropriately and the Estate
was given the right to renew the Motion at the conclusion of the
Trial. The instruction given to the Jury by the Court, essentially
incorporated the law of the State of Utah as being the applicable
law with reference to the interpretation of the Pre-nuptial
Agreement and that Utah law (UCA 75-2-204) required two (2)
elements:
1. A signed Pre-Nuptial Agreement
2. Fair disclosure prior to or incident to the signing of
the Pre-nuptial Agreement.
After deliberation the Jury found in favor of the Petitioner finding
that there was not adequate disclosure.
At the conclusion of the Trial the Estate renewed their
Motion in the form of a Motion for Judgment not Withstanding the
Verdict. The Court now having had an opportunity to review all of
the material submitted in support and opposition to the Estates
Motion, issues the following Memorandum Opinion:

Case
MICROFiiMcD

Ho8MCt&7~S^

.AUG t n ioon

Page 2
Probate No. 873006067

MEMORANDUM DECISION
The Petitioners Petition is essentially that the matter is
one of contract and that the principles of contract law apply and
that the law of the jurisidication where the contract was made
controls; or the law where there were significant contacts with the
parties or the subject matter of the agreement should control.
The Estates' position is that in the areas of interpretation
of Pre-nuptial Agreements the law is that the marital citus of the
parties should control in the interpretation of the document.
After the presentation of the evidence, it is clear that the
following are the essential facts of the case:
The Petitioner is an immigrant from Hungary having been
previously married and divorced, she moved to the United States,
having worked in Hungary as a secretary, including a secretary for a
lawyer. She had lived in the United States for some period of time
prior to meeting the Deceased. She met the Deceased who was
vacationing in Florida and after a rather brief courtship the two
were married.
The Deceased was a resident of Box Elder County and was
previously married for some (30) thirty years having had a family,
his wife died and he began to travel. In the course of his travel,
he met the Petitioner in Florida where she resided. He subsequently
returned to Florida where a brief courtship took place and then he
returned to Utah.
The Petitioner subsequently traveled to Utah for a period of time,
maintaining her residence in Florida but, taking an apartment in
Logan, Utah. She and the Petitioner received a marriage license in
Cache County. A Pre-nuptial Agreement was prepared in Box Elder
County and subsequently executed and notarized as were accompanying
wills of the parties. The parties then traveled back to Florida to
reside and were married in transit in Central/Southern Utah. The
parties set up the marital domicile and resided in Florida until the
Deceased death.

tayc
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It is uncontroverted that the bulk of the Decedents V property
is in Utah with the exception of a condominium unit in Florida and
that during the course of the marriage he frequently returned for
periods of time to the state of Utah, County of Box Elder, to look
after his business interests and holdings here while maintaining his
domicile in Florida.
The Court is presented, by Petitioners1 Motion, with the
determination of the applicable law in the interpretation of the
Pre-nuptial Agreement. It is uncontroverted that Florida Law
requires only that a Pre-nuptial Agreement be executed as contrasted
with Utah Law which requires adequate disclosure as previously
indicated in this opinion. The parties concede that there is no
Utah Law directly addressing the conflict of laws question presented
in this case, however, precedent has been supplied by both parties
in support of their positions as previously outlined.
A review of the precedent submitted indicates that there is a
differing approach established by many of the cases in the
interpretation of marital contracts. This approach, is essentially
that the matrimonial domicile is a better indication of the
intention of the parties as to the interpretation and enforcement of
contracts and relationships, in 11 ANJR, Conflicts of Laws, Section
86; Page 273, it states in part that;
"Where thj marriage takes place in the State in which the
woman has been domiciled but, with the intention of the parties,
which is carried out within a reasonable time, of establishing their
common home in another State in which the husband is domiciled, the
marital rights of the parties in the personal property of each other
owned at the time of the marriage is governed, as a general rule, by
the law of the State of their contemplated and subsequently
established matrimonial domicile; such State is to be deemed their
initial matrimonial domicile."
This approach has been taken by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
Florida, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio and New York, although
it is conceded that there is a difference of opinion among many
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Courts as to whether the validity of these agreements is to be
determined by the law of the place where they are made or by the law
of the matrimonial domicile.
The Court observes that there has been no claim, nor is there
any evidence that there was fraud or misrepresentation in the
initial entering into of the agreement and the Court specifically
finds that there was none. The Petitioners' position essentially ic
that she was not informed sufficiently by virtue of the
circumstances including her language disabilities.
One of closer cases that the Court could find bearing on this
situation is the case of OSBORN V. OSBORN, (226 North Eastern
Reporter, 2d Page 814 et sequence) when faced with a similar
question, the Court there stated;
M
The State is concerned in seeing that its concepts of public
safety are enforced in this area because marriage is a status
exclusively regulated and controlled by laws of the State of the
parties matrimonial domicile." The Court later stated, "There can
be little question that Ohio has the most significant contacts with
and paramount interest in the parties, in the agreement, and in
questions concerning its validity. In view of this conclusion it is
incumbent upon the Court to determine the validity of the
antenuptial agreement under Ohio law dealing with this subject."
In the Ohio case, there was a resident of Massachusetts and a
resident of Ohio, the contract was executed in Massachusetts but the
parties subsequently resided in Ohio. A situation much like the
instant case.
In determining the application of the law of the State of
Utah to the facts of this case, it is helpful to the Court* to refer
to Section 75-2-201 [2] U.C.A. wherein it provides;
"If a married person not domiciled in this State dies, the
right, if any, of the surviving spouse to take an elective share in
property in this State is governed by the law of the decedents1
domicile at death
".
Since the surviving spouses1 right to take an elective share, which
she is claiming, is dependant upon the validity of the Pre-nuptial
Agreement. It appears to the Court that the intention of the
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Legislature of the State of Utah is consistent with that cf what the
Court finds to be the majority of the cases in the domestic conflict
of law area and directs that those rights be determined under the
law of the place of the decedents domicile at death, which is
consistent with the marital domicile of the parties in this case and
that the public interests as stated in the Ohio case, is consistent
with the statutory directive previously quoted.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Florida Law is the
applicable law and that as provided in Florida statute 732.702
[1988] sub 2;
M
No disclosure shall be required for an agreement, contract or
waiver executed before marriage."
This being the case, Judgment not withstanding the verdict should
and is Granted in favor of the Estate Respondent in this case.
Counsel for the Estate to prepare an Order in conformance
with this opinion.
DATED this

day of August, 1990.

-P6 G
F.L. GUNNELL
DISTRICT JUDGE
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